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ABSTRACT 
This study investigates supply chain cooperative management problem. In this study, based on principal-agent, firstly 
we analyses cooperative management factors in supply chain including leading enterprise expected utilities, 
subsidiary enterprise expected incomes and leading enterprise agency cost, then the incentive contract model is 
constructed; Secondly the model is solved in the case of symmetric information and asymmetric information; At last, in 
order to make clear of the model, this paper does mathematical analysis of leading enterprise expected utilities, 
subsidiary enterprise expected incomes and leading enterprise agency cost. Some important conclusions are 
obtained: subsidiary enterprise ability, cost coefficient, absolute risk aversion factor and output variance has the same 
influence on leading enterprise expected utilities and subsidiary enterprise expected incomes; subsidiary enterprise 
ability, cost coefficient has the same influence on leading enterprise expected utilities, subsidiary enterprise expected 
incomes and leading enterprise agency cost; leading enterprise expected utilities and subsidiary enterprise expected 
incomes become bigger and bigger, but leading enterprise agency cost becomes smaller and smaller with absolute 
risk aversion factor and output variance decreased. etc. Leading enterprise can take on incentive measures 
(improving subsidiary enterprise ability, decreasing subsidiary enterprise cost coefficient.etc) to optimize supply chain 
management based on the common factors. 
Keywords: Asymmetric information, cooperative supply chain, Principal-Agent, incentive. 
1. Introduction 
With the development of information and 
globalization, supply chain management has 
become an important factor affecting world's 
economy development in a sustainable, healthy 
and rapid way. Studies of supply chain 
management are more complicated including 
theories and practices, especially cooperative 
supply chain management has become the focus 
in the recent 20 years. Supply chain is related to 
many industries which are different in departments, 
functions and operations, and the competition can 
be formed only by the cooperation between 
industries, what is more, supply chain activities 
cannot be achieved until resources of different 
industries are integrated. Not only it is the 
significance of supply chain coordination, but it is 
the way of eliminating the obstacles across 
industries. Therefore, the problem of cooperative 
supply chain management needs to be solved 
urgently. Based on the findings from existing 
literatures, we found that existing studies discuss 
the information technology and incentive theory.   
Information technology is an important tool in 
dealing with supply chain management. To verify 
the importance of information, Prajogo and 
Olhager put forward supply chain management 
concept on the background of information, that 
was, the integration of logistics information 
resources could drive the integration of logistics 
resources, and information and information sharing 
had a significant impact on supply chain 
performance[1]; Barton and Thomas pointed out 
that supply chain management had become an 
increasingly important tool to improve the situation 
of manufacturing industry, and rapid reaction 
abilities, intelligent integration system and 
management capabilities were all the key to create 
a robust supply chain[2]; Lee emphasized the 
importance of information resources integration, its 
contents included: demand, inventory status, 
production plan, production time, promotion plan, 
demand forecast and transportation routes 
sharing[3]. Research also focused on Information 
tool, such as, Wamba and Chatfield discussed the  
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application of RF technology in the logistics 
resources integration [4]. Meanwhile, a dynamic 
self-assessment of performance on supply chains 
operating in markets was put forward based on 
information simulation platform [5][6]. 
So we can conclude that the quantitative model in 
the above literatures is information-based. 
Incentive theory is another important way of 
solving cooperative supply chain management 
problem due to the high cost with information 
technology. ”Cooperation” is one key word of 
incentive theory, such as, Christopher thought it 
need cooperation for different supply chain parts in 
network times[7];With the help of cooperative 
game theory, Nagarajan and Sosˇic´ analyzed the 
integration problem of supply chain, and proposed 
the theory of ‘vision’, which provided one new way 
for cooperative supply chain management [8].   
“Trust” is another key word of incentive theory, 
such as, Handfield, Nichols and Sahay thought the 
trust mechanism is of great importance for supply 
chain management, holding that robust supply 
chain is needed to ensure the mutual trust and 
responsibilities among the system for a long time, 
and the sharing of information, risk and revenue 
was crucial [9][10]. 
“Agent” is also the key word of incentive theory, such 
as, on the background of global supply chain 
manufacture network, Jiao, You and Kumar set up a 
multi-agent (upstream and downstream enterprises 
involved in supply chain), multi-contracting 
negotiations (customer demand) model, which is 
helpful for dealing with spontaneous or semi-
spontaneous problem in supply chain [11]; Brintrup 
established the supplier selection model of multi-
agent, multi-target and multi-role at the aim of 
reducing transaction time and increasing corporate 
revenue [12];From the perspective of customer 
needs,  Akanle  and Zhang put forward optimizing the 
configuration for supply chain, and they built a multi-
agent model coordinating iterative bidding 
mechanism based on interactive algorithms, got the 
optimum based on genetic algorithm in the end[13]. 
Actually, the incentive theory in the above literatures 
is an important and new method in dealing with 
supply chain cooperative management problem. 
To sum up, existing literatures mainly focus on 
resources configuration, supply chain cooperation, 
trust mechanism and agent model respectively; the 
problem is that how to coordinate leading 
enterprise and subsidiary enterprise overall. At 
present, the problem has not been resolved by 
related researches. In this paper, based on 
principal-agent, it analyzes the cooperative 
management problem in the supply chain, so the 
incentive contract model is constructed and solved 
in the case of symmetric information and 
asymmetric information; Some important 
conclusions can be obtained by the model. We 
organize this paper as following: In section 2, we 
present the incentive contract model, which forms 
the theoretical foundation of this study. In section 
3, we solve the model, which provide the base for 
analysis. In section 4, we present the analytical 
model through which we can coordinate leading 
enterprise and subsidiary enterprise. Finally we 
conclude the whole study. 
2. Principal-agent model of cooperative supply 
chain management 
The origin and development of principal-agent 
theory provides scientific solution for the incentive 
problem of supply chain, and mechanism design is 
effective way of tackling with principal-agent 
problem,by looking for the common parameter 
related to both the principal and the agent in case 
of symmetric information and asymmetric 
information [14]. 
Leading enterprise and subsidiary enterprise are 
comprised of Stackelberg model, in which, leading 
enterprise is the principal (one leading enterprise 
assumed), subsidiary enterprise is the agent(one 
subsidiary enterprise assumed). Leading enterprise 
monitors the activities of subsidiary enterprise while 
paying agency cost. In the paper, the factors related 
to the model consist of leading enterprise expected 
utilities, subsidiary enterprise expected incomes and 
leading enterprise agency cost. 
2.1 Mathematical description of model 
(1)Subsidiary enterprise expected incomes 
(a)The sales model 
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Subsidiary enterprise provides products or service 
to the market in a certain level of effort, the sales 
of products or service (that is Q ) are subjected to 
subsidiary enterprise ability, market prosperity and 
market random. 
T %[$I4 
Where 4 is the sales; A is subsidiary enterprise 
ability ( 0!A );x is the effort, [I is the function, 
and 
 ![I ,that means marginal sales are 
positive, that also means the sales are positive 
with subsidiary enterprise ability;  d[I , that 
means the rate of increasing in sales is 
decreasing; The constant B is market prosperity; 
T is market ran, and a VT 1 凚 V is the 
output variance凛 .
If  U[[I  , where    U 凞equation
 U[[I  is  consistent  with the  restrictions 
above. Supposing U[;  , so T %$;4 .
And  we  can  see  the  full  linear  relations  in 
expression 4;[U oo ,  so T %[$I4 
is simplified as T %$[4  when [[I   .
(b) Subsidiary enterprise incomes 
Subsidiary enterprise generates sales in a certain 
level of effort, then leading enterprise needs to 
pay for subsidiary enterprise’s work: 
4FS4 ˅˄V  ED
Where is the price of products or service,
4FS ˅˄  is the market returns,D is the fixed 
Income,E is the market gains share. 
(c) Subsidiary enterprise cost and profits 
Subsidiary enterprise’s direct cost is [& when 
providing products or service, and
 
 t! [&[& . If  UP[[&  凞where  
  !! UP 凞and U[;  ,.then  UP;[&  
(   ! UUU ), and  UP[[&   is 
consistent with the restrictions above. So 
 UP;[&   is simplified as 
E[[&   when 
3, 22
b
m r  ,  whereb is cost coefficient. 
In addition, subsidiary enterprise must pay risk 
cost when participating in collaborative incentive 
contract, and subsidiary enterprise’s certainty 
equivalent profits (, ) reflect its actual income. 
Supposing the utilities 
r zu e   (Exponential 
distribution) for subsidiary enterprise, where 
random] is the income(that is different from s( )Q
), r is absolute risk aversion factor, and 0䠚r ,and
a] QP1
So subsidiary enterprise expected profits are 
2
2
2
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Because ,X(X  凞  HH

,U
UQPU    凞  random 
variable-



E[%$[FS,  TED
obeys Normal distribution. 
So subsidiary enterprise expected profits are 
1
2
˄ ( ) ( )˅
( ( ) ( ) )
2
EI E s Q C x
bx
E p c Ax BD E T
 
     

E[%$[FS  ED
The variance of subsidiary enterprise profits are

  VEFS',  , then subsidiary 
enterprise’s certainty equivalent profits are 
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
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2 2 2
( ) ( )
2
1
( )
2
bx
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    
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Where ˅˄  VEFSU  is risk cost.  
(2) Leading enterprise utilities 
Leading enterprise is risk neutral, and it pays more 
attention to the market prosperity. According to (a 
(b)(c) above凞 leading enterprise expected utilities is 
( ( ) ( ) )
( ( ) ( ) )
EU E p c Q s Q
E p c Q p c QD E
  
    
 %$[FS  ED
(3) Leading enterprise agency cost 
In the case of asymmetric information, the principal 
cannot observe the agent's effort. There are two 
additional kinds of agency cost compared with 
symmetric information: one is risk cost, another is 
incentive cost: 

 VEFSU5  
In the case of symmetric information凞 leading
enterprise risk cost is 0; In the case of asymmetric 
information, leading enterprise risk cost is 

 VEFSU5  
Incentive cost refers to the difference between high 
expected revenue on the condition of symmetric 
information and low expected revenue on the 
condition of asymmetric information. That means 
subsidiary enterprise works harder in case of 
symmetric information than in case of asymmetric 
information. So leading enterprise expected utilities 
will decrease in case of asymmetric information. 
The difference ( 䠅䠄 1OE ) between expected utilities 
in case of symmetric information and asymmetric 
information can be calculated based on the output 
function ( ))(()( BAxcpOE  ); the difference 
( 䠅䠄 1CE ) between subsidiary enterprise cost in 
case of symmetric information and asymmetric 
information can be calculated based on the cost 
function (
2
2bxC  ); at last, leading enterprise 
agency cost is 
  &(2(57&  
2.2 Establishment of model 

s is the lowest income that subsidiary enterprise 
requires, and subsidiary enterprise will not 
participate in collaborative incentive contract when 
certainty equivalent profits are less than 
V . The 
contract prerequisite that subsidiary enterprise 
participate in collaborative incentive contract is 
2
2 2 2
( ) ( )
2
1
( )
2
bx
p c Ax B
r p c s
D E
E V

   
  t
And cooperative supply chain management model 
including leading enterprise and subsidiary 
enterprise is 
3. Solution for cooperative supply chain 
management model
3.1 Symmetric information 
Leading enterprise can monitor subsidiary 
enterprise in case of symmetric information, and 
leading enterprise will not motivate subsidiary 
enterprise. At the same time, leading enterprise 
must pay the least for subsidiary enterprise even if 
the latter wants the most. Based on the game 
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
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relations, subsidiary enterprise will get the lowest 
in the end ( 
s ). So cooperative supply chain 
management model including leading enterprise 
and subsidiary enterprise is changed as 
(12) 
Do differentiation for x
2
2 2 2 '
{ ( ) ( )
2
1
( ) - } 0
2
bx
p c Ax B
r p c s
D E
E V 
   
   
So
E
FS$[    E
In case of symmetric information, market gains 
share E  cannot be changed whether subsidiary 
enterprise works hard or not, and leading 
enterprises will not motivate subsidiary enterprise 
by gain market share, subsidiary enterprise will get 
the unchanged revenue in the end. 
So
b
cpAxx )(1
 |  , 01  |  EE                  (15) 
then 
b
cpAs
2
)( 22
1
 |

 DD                                (16) 
3.2 Asymmetric information 
(1).Leading enterprise expected utilities and 
subsidiary enterprise expected incomes 
In the case of asymmetric information, subsidiary 
enterprise will try its best to increase 

s  when 
),( ED  is given. And cooperative supply chain 
management model is reasonable.  
Do differentiation for x
2
2 2 2 '
{ ( ) ( )
2
1
( ) } 0
2
bx
p c Ax B
r p c
D E
E V
   
   
So
b
cpAx )(  E                                                 (18) 
Then leading enterprise takes actions to increase 
its expected utilities when observing x
Do differentiation for E
0)}(䠅䠄)1({ '   BAxcpED          (19) 
So
2
2
1 2A
BbA  E                                      (20) 
Actually, rational subsidiary enterprise will get  

s
at mostly, that is 
2
2 2 2
( ) ( )
2
1
( )
2
bx
p c Ax B
r p c s
D E
E V 
   
   
So both subsidiary enterprise and leading 
enterprise will determine E , and market gain 
share E  is known by leading enterprise and 
subsidiary enterprise. 
Do differentiation for E
(13) 
(14) 
(17) 
(21) 
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222 Arb
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And 21 EE  , 2
2
1 2A
BbA  E ,
b
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22 2 E 
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Eventually, leading enterprise expected utilities      
( ED , is know) are 
2
2 2 2
( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
2
1
( ) ( ) ( )
2
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E U p c Ax B s
r p c p c Ax B
E
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     
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And subsidiary enterprise expected incomes          
( ED , is know) are 
)/1(2
)(
)(
2
1
2
))(())((
22
22
222
2
Arbb
Acps
cprbxs
BAxcpQsE
V
VE
ED

 
  
 


            (27) 
Subsidiary enterprise expected profits must be 

s  whether it works hard or not. Leading  
enterprise should motivate subsidiary enterprise 
by expected incomes instead of expected profits. 
This paper will discuss subsidiary enterprise 
expected incomes further. 
(2) Leading enterprise agency cost 
The optimal effort * ( ) /x A p c b  and 
( ) /x A p c bE  -are caculatied respectively 
in case of asymmetric  information .and  symmetric  
information.
So the output difference for leading enterprise is 
*
1
2 2
2 2
˄ ˅ ( ) [˄ ˅
( )˄ ) ]
1 /
E O p c Ax B
p c r
Ax B
r b A
V
V
  
   
It will cost subsidiary enterprise by 
2
2bxC   when 
leading enterprise gets the extra output 
22
22
/1
)(
Arb
rcp
V
V

 )
In case of asymmetric information and symmetric 
information, the cost difference for subsidiary 
enterprise is 
2 2
1
2 2 4 2
2
2 2 2
˄ ˅ ( ( ) ( ) )
2
2 /
( )
2(1 / )
b
E C x x
r br A
p c
r b A
V V
V
   
 
So incentive cost for leading enterprise is 
1 1
2
2 2
2 2
2 2 2
2 2
2
2 2 2
( ) ( ) ( )
1
( ) [
1 /
2 /
]
2(1 / )
/
( )
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E L E O E C
p c r
r b A
r b A
r b A
r b A
p c r
r b A
V V
V
V
VV V
 
  
 
  
(22)
(24)
(25)
(28)
(29)
(30)
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And risk cost is: 
So leading enterprise agency cost is 
)/1(2
1)(
)/1(2
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4. Analysis and discussion of model 
In order to make clear of the parameters relations, 
this paper does mathematical analysis of leading 
enterprise expected utilities, subsidiary enterprise 
expected incomes and leading enterprise agency 
cost ( 0䚸䚸䚸r䚸䚸 2 !

VsBbA ).
4.1 Analysis of leading enterprise expected utilities 
0
)r(
䠅r2䠄)()( 222
223
2 !
 w
w
V
V
bAb
bAAcp
A
UE
㸦㸦 0)2 ! cp the same below㸧               (33) 
It indicates that leading enterprise expected 
utilities( ( )E U ) are positive with subsidiary 
enterprise ability( A).
0
)r(2
䠅r2䠄)()( 2222
224
2 
 w
w
V
V
bAb
bAAcp
b
UE
     (34) 
It indicates that leading enterprise expected utilities 
( ( )E U ) are negative with subsidiary enterprise 
cost coefficient (b ).
0
)/r1(2
)()( 222
2
2 
 w
w
Ab
cp
r
UE
V
V
       (35) 
It indicates that leading enterprise expected utilities 
( ( )E U ) are negative with subsidiary enterprise 
absolute risk aversion factor ( r ).
0)( ! w
w cp
B
UE
, 01)(  w
w

s
UE
            (36) 
It indicates that leading enterprise expected utilities 
( ( )E U ) are positive with market prosperity ( B ); 
leading enterprise expected utilities ( ( )E U ) are 
negative with the lowest requirement of subsidiary 
enterprise (s ).
0
)r(
r)(
)(
222
4
2
2 
 w
w
VV bA
Acp
UE
            (37) 
It indicates that leading enterprise expected 
utilities( ( )E U ) are negative with output variance    
( 2V ).
To sum up, leading enterprise  expected  utilities  
( ( )E U ) are positive with subsidiary enterprise 
ability ( A ) and market prosperity( B );leading 
enterprise expected utilities ( ( )E U ) are negative 
with subsidiary enterprise cost coefficient(b ), 
subsidiary enterprise absolute risk aversion 
factor( r ),the lowest requirement of subsidiary 
enterprise( V )and output variance( V ).  
4.2 Discussion of subsidiary enterprise expected 
incomes 
Subsidiary enterprise expected incomes model
( 
 

$UEE
$FSV4V( V
  ) is similar 
with leading enterprise expected utilities model 

2 2 2
2 2
2 2 2
1
( )
2
( )
2(1 / )
R r p c
r p c
r b A
E V
V
V
 
 
(31) 
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(
2 2
2 2
( )
( ) ( )
2 (1 / )
p c A
E U p c B s
b r b AV 
    ),
both of which consist of expression
$  $UEEFS V , and based on 
the analysis above, we can get the results:  
subsidiary enterprise expected incomes ( ( ( ) )E s Q )
are positive with subsidiary enterprise ability ( A); 
Subsidiary enterprise expected incomes ( ( ( ) )E s Q )
are negative with subsidiary enterprise absolute 
risk aversion factor ( r ), subsidiary enterprise cost 
coefficient and output variance(
2V ).Beacause 
01))(( ! w
w

s
QsE
, subsidiary enterprise expected 
incomes ( ( ( ) )E s Q ) are positive with the lowest 
requirement of subsidiary enterprise (

s  ). 
To sum up, subsidiary enterprise ability ( A ),
subsidiary enterprise absolute risk aversion factor  
( r ),subsidiary enterprise cost coefficient (b )and 
output variance ( 2V )(except the lowest 
requirement of subsidiary enterprise (

s ))have the 
same influence on leading enterprise expected 
utilities( ( )E U )and subsidiary enterprise expected 
incomes ( ( ( ) )E s Q )
4.3 Analysis of leading enterprise agency cost 
0
)r(2
r)( 222
42
2
2 ! w
w
V
V
bA
bcp
A
TC
               (38) 
It indicates that leading enterprise agency cost      
(TC ) are positive with subsidiary enterprise 
ability   ( 2A )
0
)r/(2
)( 222
2
2 
 w
w
VAb
Acp
b
TC
            (39) 
It indicates that leading enterprise agency cost      
(TC ) are negative with subsidiary enterprise cost 
coefficient (b ).
0
)/r1(2
)( 222
2
2 ! w
w
Ab
cp
r
TC
V
V
           (40) 
It indicates that leading enterprise agency cost  
(TC ) are positive with subsidiary enterprise 
absolute risk aversion factor ( r  ). 
0
)/r1(2
)( 222
2
2 ! w
w
Ab
rcpTC VV            (41) 
It indicates that leading enterprise agency cost   
(TC ) are positive with output variance ( 2V  ). 
To sum up, leading enterprise agency cost (TC  ) 
are positive with subsidiary enterprise ability ( 2A ),
subsidiary enterprise absolute risk aversion factor  
( r  ) and output variance ( 2V ); leading enterprise 
agency cost (TC ) are negative with subsidiary 
enterprise cost coefficient (b ).
To summary, subsidiary enterprise ability ( A ),
subsidiary enterprise absolute risk aversion factor  
( r ), subsidiary enterprise cost coefficient (b ) and 
output variance ( 2V ) have the influence on leading 
enterprise expected utilities ( ( )E U ), subsidiary 
enterprise expected incomes ( ( ( ) )E s Q ) and 
leading enterprise agency cost (TC ); subsidiary 
enterprise ability ( A ), subsidiary enterprise 
absolute risk aversion factor ( r ), subsidiary 
enterprise cost coefficient (b ) and output variance 
( 2V ) have the same influence on leading 
enterprise expected utilities ( ( )E U ) and subsidiary 
enterprise expected incomes ( ( ( ) )E s Q ); 
subsidiary enterprise ability ( A ) and subsidiary 
enterprise cost coefficient (b ) have the same 
influence  on  leading  enterprise  expected  
utilities ( ( )E U ), subsidiary enterprise expected 
incomes ( ( ( ) )E s Q ) and leading enterprise agency 
cost (TC ) . 
Leading enterprise can take on incentive 
measures to optimize supply chain based on the 
common factors. 
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5. Conclusions 
Under asymmetric information, subsidiary 
enterprise has first-mover advantage of earning 
illegal profits with private information; and leading 
enterprise needs to pay agency cost when 
monitoring subsidiary enterprise, so subsidiary 
enterprise intends to earn extra profits; while 
leading enterprise cannot blindly suppress 
subsidiary enterprise in order to inhibit subsidiary 
enterprise of obtaining additional income. 
Based on principal-agent凞 this paper analyses 
cooperative management  problem in supply chain, 
so the incentive contract model is constructed and 
solved in the case of symmetric information and 
asymmetric information. Some important 
conclusions are obtained: leading enterprise 
expected utilities ( )E U , subsidiary enterprise 
expected incomes ( ( ) )E s Q and leading enterprise 
agency cost7& are all affected by subsidiary 
enterprise ability A, cost coefficientb ,absolute  
risk aversion factor r and output variance
2V ; A,b ,
r and
2V has the same influence on ( )E U  and 
( ( ) )E s Q ; A,b has the same influence on ( )E U ,
( ( ) )E s Q andTC .
Leading enterprise can take on incentive measures 
to optimize supply chain management based on 
the common factors. So we should. 
(1).improve subsidiary enterprise ability 
Subsidiary enterprise ability is related to institution, 
technology, service, scale, capital and culture, etc. 
So Leading enterprise should give enough support 
to subsidiary enterprise in above fields. 
Consequently, leading enterprise agency cost is 
increased, but leading enterprise expected utilities 
is improved as well as the healthy development of 
subsidiary enterprise. 
(2) reduce subsidiary enterprise cost coefficient 
Similar with subsidiary enterprise ability, subsidiary 
enterprise cost coefficient is inversed with 
enterprise scale, staff ability, equipment 
technology. etc. So Leading enterprise may help 
subsidiary enterprise train staff, gain authentication 
and renovate equipment, etc. Consequently, 
leading enterprise agency cost is decreased, but 
both leading enterprise expected utilities and 
subsidiary enterprise expected incomes are 
increased, thus subsidiary enterprise tackling with 
market problems easily. 
(3).lower subsidiary enterprise absolute risk 
aversion 
Subsidiary enterprise absolute risk aversion 
indicates that small enterprise cannot meet with 
market risks well due to its insufficient capital and 
ability, thus unwilling deal with risk project. So 
Leading enterprise can give policy support for 
subsidiary enterprise, then subsidiary enterprise is 
motivated to provide products or service to the 
market in a high level of effort. Consequently, both 
leading enterprise expected utilities and subsidiary 
enterprise expected incomes are increased, while 
leading enterprise agency cost is decreased. 
(4) pay attention to market random factors 
Market random factors have the same meaning 
with uncertainties. Leading enterprise needs to 
keep steady policy, guarantee industry healthy 
development, and prevent vicious competitions, 
thus making the SCN (Supply Chain Network) 
robust.  
Consequently, leading enterprise expected utilities 
as well as subsidiary enterprise expected incomes 
can be improved largely; Meanwhile, leading 
enterprise agency cost will be reduced 
substantially. 
In short, based on the detailed analysis of supply 
chain cooperation problem, the research can 
provide the comprehensive methodology for 
cooperative supply chain management. 
Of course, like all of the researches, this paper has 
certain limitations and deficiencies. To guarantee 
the computability of model, consequently, the cost 
function is simplified a, and the sales function is 
simplified as 
2
( )
2
bx
C x  , and the sales function is 
simplified as xQ A B T    we should go 
further study on the hypothesis. 
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